By any number of measures, Washington’s Russia policy has failed. While ostensibly suffering from diplomatic and economic isolation under a US-led international sanctions regime, Moscow has succeeded in challenging a wide range of American interests, most notably in Ukraine, Syria, and cyberspace.
Coming up with a new approach on Russia should therefore be a top priority for either President Hillary Clinton or President Donald Trump soon after Jan. 20, 2017. So far, however, neither candidate has offered a vision that goes beyond the failed tropes of the past, with Clinton painting Russian President Vladimir Putin as a cartoonish villain and Trump viewing Moscow as an ally in-waiting.
The most common US policy responses to Russia — from both Republican and Democratic administrations across three decades — have depended either on the hope that Moscow can be fully defeated or that it can become a friend and fellow democracy. But Russia is not a democracy, nor is it democratizing, and although Russia may be in secular decline, it is a major power on the world stage.
The next president needs to accept that Moscow cannot simply be defeated or contained in the emerging multipolar, globalized world order. It must be engaged through a comprehensive balance of cooperation and competition.
The next president will have to persuade Moscow to cooperate where cooperation is needed on things like preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) while limiting room for Russia to maneuver where its interests largely oppose American ones, such as in Syria. And this new US policy must also recognize that tensions with Russia do not divide neatly along the lines of geography or individual issues, and that even shared interests will seldom overlap entirely.
The goal should involve constructing a web of interactions, both cooperative and competitive, that yields the most beneficial balance for our national interests. But above all, rather than setting out to defeat or transform Russia, a new US approach should deal with Russia as it really is.
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Understand That It’s Not Just About Putin
The next president must begin by abandoning the two axioms that have plagued Washington’s Russia policymaking for the last 25 years: The first, that Moscow opposes the United States because of the Kremlin’s undemocratic politics. And, secondly, that areas of agreement between the two countries can be walled off from areas of conflict.
It’s also essential to recognize that America’s problems with Russia aren’t solely because of Putin: They’re geopolitical. Neither Putin’s departure nor broader regime change in Russia will resolve this challenge.
Putin stands squarely within centuries of tradition in Russian strategic thinking, and his foreign policy enjoys overwhelming elite support while resonating with the public. Geopolitical competition of some dimension is inevitable among major powers with strategic interests stretching across the globe, regardless of what politics they practice at home.
The next administration needs to break with its predecessors and realize that relations with Moscow can’t simply be compartmentalized into areas of cooperation and disagreement. American actions on one issue will influence Russia’s assessment of US approaches on other issues.
The George W. Bush administration, for example, unsuccessfully sought to insulate counterterrorism cooperation following 9/11 from competition with Moscow in the former Soviet space. Barack Obama’s administration hoped to continue cooperation on nuclear security even as overall relations deteriorated sharply.
But that, too, failed, evidenced by Russia’s skipping the US-sponsored nuclear security summit in April and suspending the Plutonium Disposition Agreement because of “hostile” American actions last week.
After 1991, successive US administrations attempted to integrate Russia into the West by encouraging its transformation from a totalitarian Communist state into a free-market democracy. At a time of Russian weakness following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Washington also reshaped the structure of Europe by enlarging NATO and supporting the expansion of the European Union.
But as Moscow regained its geopolitical strength and expanded its ambitions under Putin, Russia pushed back against US efforts, first in the former Soviet Union, then in Europe, and more recently in the broader Middle East. After 25 years of US and European efforts, Russia has made it clear that it is not interested in integrating into the West and that it is prepared to challenge the United States along a broad front, even by interfering in domestic US politics.
US policy must adapt to new challenges, and Washington may need to give ground on other, lesser priorities. For example, if forced to choose between securing cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation and supporting pro-Western political change in Russia’s neighborhood, a tactical withdrawal on the latter may be necessary to preserve a larger victory on arms control.
In other cases, Moscow’s actions that directly threaten vital US interests will demand that Washington impose costs in proportion to the threat, such as supporting NATO allies when Russia deploys its forces or conducts provocative military exercises along their borders.
Stop Ukraine From Becoming a Frozen Conflict
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was the tipping point for the tensions and mistrust that define the US-Russia relationship today. Washington used the pressure of international sanctions and diplomatic isolation to compel Moscow to withdraw from Ukraine.
But the Russians responded with countermeasures of their own, and the resulting reciprocal sanctions and warring narratives now combine to block even basic diplomatic engagement.
Making any sort of diplomatic progress with the Kremlin will first hinge on how the next US president interprets Moscow’s motivations in Ukraine: Is Russia primarily holding Ukraine hostage because of its fear of Western encirclement and regime change?
Or is Putin exploiting Ukraine’s vulnerability for his government’s political and territorial aggrandizement? The answer is most likely a combination of both, but from a policy perspective it makes sense to operate on the basis of the more positive interpretation, while hedging against the chance of being wrong.
In many respects, the hedge is already in place. NATO has decided to rotate new forces through the Baltic States and stepped up planning for various contingencies involving conflict with Russia.
The West’s support for political and economic reform in Ukraine — to help build a competent democratic state and raise standards of living — is another important part of the strategy. But a solution to the crisis in Ukraine will need more than preparing for the worst-case scenario.
A voluntary Russian withdrawal from Ukraine depends for now on the highly flawed Minsk II peace deal signed in February 2015 by France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine. Despite Minsk’s obvious imperfection, it has two key features that cannot be abandoned: a legal and political commitment undertaken by major European powers and Russia and military de-escalation on the ground linked to a sustainable political process for ending the conflict.
Abandoning either element would practically guarantee that eastern Ukraine will become yet another frozen conflict. Although Washington is not a signatory to the deal, the United States can help incentivize Minsk for Moscow by linking specific sanctions relief to concrete Russian steps it can implement to sustain a cease-fire, withdraw heavy military equipment from the zone of conflict, and return control of Ukraine’s side of the border with Russia to Kiev.
Have an Honest Talk About Europe
For better or worse, Moscow retains sufficient power to shape the security environment in Europe. In this realm, the task for the next president in shaping US policy will be to insulate European allies against Russian action in the short term while laying the groundwork for a more durable European security framework, with Russian participation, in the long term.
The next administration’s most urgent and immediate goal should be to maintain the integrity of NATO as the guarantor of European security. In light of Russia’s threatening behavior, many of its neighbors look to the transatlantic alliance, and the United States in particular, for the necessary commitment of manpower, hardware, and political will.
Washington must also bolster NATO’s collective defense capabilities, not simply by spending more, but by coordinating efforts and expenditures far better. US leadership in this arena is essential, and American credibility in Europe will be judged not just by what is said and done on the continent, but by Washington’s performance in managing security commitments globally, such as in East Asia and the greater Middle East.
Enhancing the forums in which Russia and the West participate, like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the NATO-Russia Council, even if they can’t resolve or even manage disagreements, is a necessary step toward preventing conflict.
The OSCE, still the only fully inclusive security organization for North America, Europe, and the entire former Soviet space, has an important role to play. Washington should seek to re-launch talks with Moscow and its place in the European security architecture through the body in an unofficial, second track format.
Where these discussions will end up is an open question. But the next administration will have better chances of reducing tensions and building a stable security order in Europe by allowing Russia’s legitimate security interests in the region to be heard.
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